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Chair: Vikas Agarwal 
Major Academic Unit: Finance 
This study examines the behavior of small-cap equity mutual fund managers during 
certain turning points in the economic cycle. Although each recession is unique, there is evidence 
supporting time variation in equity style performance in and around recession periods. In 
general, large-cap firms have greater access to capital thereby reducing financial stress during 
recessions compared to small-cap firms. As a result, some managers may use style rotation as a 
tool to improve their performance or reduce risk during these turning points in the economic 
cycle. I show that during the last two NBER cycle recessions, small-cap managers significantly 
increase holdings in large-cap stocks following the peak in economic activity. I find some 
evidence of a positive relation between skill and large-cap holdings: skilled small-cap managers 
are more likely to increase holdings in large-cap stocks in recession periods than unskilled ones. 
Finally, the evidence that managers reap the reward of style rotation is mixed. During the first 
recession period, the results indicate improved returns for managers that rotate into large-cap 
stocks with weaker evidence of improved flows. During the second recession period, flows 
improve but not returns. One possible explanation for this result is that large-cap stocks did not 
provide the same boost to performance during the second recession as they did during the first. 





”Small-cap focused funds provide an ideal setting to assess the prevalence and consequences of 
style drift behavior.” (Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis, 2017) 
 Style-focused equity mutual funds provide investors with an effective means to access 
professional management and create a diversified portfolio that will achieve their specified return 
and risk parameters. In carrying out their professional duties, managers may drift from their 
designated style for any number of reasons. For example, a recent study found evidence that 
managers seek to exploit certain “informational advantages” such as industry expertise and will 
concentrate in these holdings (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005). Due to time-variation in 
equity style performance, some managers may use style rotation as a tool to improve their 
performance or reduce risk during certain phases of the economic cycle. For example, research 
shows that small-cap equities have a much higher level of risk than large-cap equities (Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann, 2000; Roll, 1981). As a result, large-cap stocks tend to outperform 
small-cap stocks going into a recession and the reverse occurs following the trough of economic 
activity (Switzer, 2010). This time-variation in equity style performance may provide small-cap 
managers with an incentive to rotate away from their stated style by increasing large-cap stock 
holdings prior to a recession as a means of potentially enhancing performance or reducing risk.  
This idea, which I refer to as time-varying style rotation or TVSR, draws from two related literature 
streams: namely style drift and time-variation in fund manager behavior. This paper also builds on 
the work done by Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017), by examining possible motivations for TVSR 
and the type of manager that is likely to engage in this behavior. 
Mutual fund investment style has been of interest to researchers and investment 
professionals alike for decades due to the dramatic increase in assets managed professionally and 
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the importance of style to both mutual fund allocation and performance evaluation by retail and 
institutional investors (Chan, Hsiu-Lang, and Lakonishok, 2002; Qian and Shi, 2018). According 
to the Investment Company Institute total net assets invested in actively managed domestic equity 
funds increased approximately $5 trillion to $5.6 trillion from 1993 to 2019, which represents over 
40% of the total actively managed fund assets (p 237).1 While this growth provided investors with 
a wide assortment of styles to choose from, the proliferation of choices also complicates the mutual 
fund selection and evaluation process.  
The approach many investors use to combine various investment styles within a portfolio 
has its roots in academic theory. Within the investment industry the term “asset allocation” refers 
to a portfolio selection methodology based on the mean-variance optimization approach developed 
by Markowitz (1952), which encourages investors to construct diversified portfolios that seek to 
maximize the potential expected return for a given level of risk. For example, wealth management 
firms develop customized capital market assumptions (i.e. expected returns, standard deviations, 
and correlations) that serve as inputs for constrained optimization techniques, which are used to 
create recommended asset class weights designed to achieve various combinations of risk and 
return in a portfolio.2 Pástor (2000) provides the following example of this “data-based” technique: 
“sample estimates of the mean and covariance matrix of asset returns can be used to compute the 
optimal weights in a mean-variance framework.” 
Another approach to portfolio selection is the use of asset pricing models (Pástor, 2000). 
One example is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which was developed in the early 1960s 
to explain how the expected return of an investment should be affected by its risk (Perold, 2004).  
___________________________________ 
1 Investment Company Institute Fact Book 2020: https://www.icifactbook.org 





Operating under several simplifying assumptions, CAPM offers investors a framework for 
assessing risk by delineating between systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Since company 
specific risk can be diversified away, the sole risk factor becomes the market. Subsequent research 
identified other factors that impact returns, most notably Fama and French (1992) found that firm 
size and book-to-market ratios largely explain the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. 
Commenting on a paper written the following year (Fama and French, 1993), Daniel and Titman 
(1997) point out that the size and value factors serve as “proxies for the firm’s loading on priced 
risk factors.” The authors also identify other “characteristics” that explain cross-section returns 
such as dividends, historical returns, valuation, etc. 
Whereas style plays a role in portfolio selection, style drift has important implications for 
maintaining a portfolio’s optimal asset mix. Wermers (2012) incorporates prior findings to identify 
how researchers measure style drift: “the shift in loadings on priced style factors (e.g., Fama and 
French (1993)) or style characteristics (e.g., Daniel and Titman (1997)).” Although these “returns-
based” measures reflect what investors ultimately receive, they do not provide information on fund 
manager adjustments (Brown, Harlow, and Zhang, 2009). Mutual fund holdings analysis allows 
researchers and investors to not only develop a deeper understanding of style drift, but to identify 
and track a mutual fund manager’s exposure to certain equity styles. For example, the Morningstar 
Style BoxTM allows investors to evaluate the characteristics of individual stocks held by a manager, 
based on the asset class (e.g. small-cap vs. large-cap) and/or style (e.g. value vs. growth), to 
categorize each equity mutual fund within a 3x3 matrix.3 
___________________________________ 






Researchers recognize the role Morningstar’s classification system has played in the 
institutionalization of equity style, which creates an incentive for mutual fund managers to 
specialize thereby allowing investors to maintain an optimal portfolio mix (Brown, Harlow, and 
Zhang, 2009; Wermers, 2012). To declare a style specialization, a manager includes a style 
designation within the fund’s name thereby subjecting herself to compliance with the Names Rule 
(see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the rule and its implications). Even with a 2001 
change requiring greater style purity, the rule allows managers to engage in both passive drift (i.e. 
price appreciation of existing holdings) and active drift (i.e. purchases outside of the style 
designation) in pursuit of their risk and return objectives. Wermers (2012) found “that a significant 
amount of style drift results from active manager trades…” The degree to which managers can 
engage in active drift is a function of their stated investment emphasis and benchmark defined in 
the fund prospectus. Despite an ostensible manager preference for style specialization, the 
tendency to drift from their stated emphasis is well documented in the academic literature (Brown, 
Harlow, and Zhang, 2009; Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis, 2017; Chan, Hsiu-Lang, and Lakonishok, 
2002; Wermers, 2012). While there are concerns over the adverse impact to investors (Cao, Iliev, 
and Velthuis, 2017; Chua and Tam, 2020), investment managers have a fiduciary responsibility to 
their clients that is enforced by the SEC (Laby, 2018). Therefore, defining what constitutes style 
drift and identifying the implications of this behavior remains a challenge. 
Even though portfolio manager drift may work against an investor’s desire to achieve an 
optimal portfolio allocation, the empirical evidence supports that investors prefer performance 
over style consistency. In what is arguably the seminal paper on mutual fund manager performance 
and flows, Berk and Green (2004) present a model that recognizes some managers possess skill 
and investors reward these managers with positive flows. Subsequent empirical evidence provides 
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support for an asymmetric performance-flow relationship: managers with good performance are 
rewarded with positive net flows, yet managers with poor performance are not penalized with 
negative net flows (Gruber, 1996). Recent research brings this conclusion into question and 
provides a more nuanced understanding of this relationship. Cashman, Deli, Nardari, and 
Villupuram (2012) find a symmetric performance-flow relationship: managers with excellent 
performance are rewarded with positive net flows and managers with bad performance are 
penalized with negative net flows. The authors also analyze the performance-flow relationship 
using gross flows and find existing investors increased their withdrawals as performance 
deteriorates and find both economically and statistically significant results supporting prior 
research findings that the best performing funds are rewarded with inflows (pp 729, 731).  
Another thread in the literature explores the way in which investors evaluate performance. 
In a perfect world, investors would be aware of the various factors that affect stock returns (e.g. 
size, value, momentum, and industry to name a few) and would decompose a mutual fund 
manager’s returns to identify her contribution or skill. Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) find that 
in the aggregate mutual fund investors do not pay attention to these factors when assessing returns. 
Consistent with prior research (Teo and Woo, 2004), the authors find a positive relationship 
between style returns (consistent with the Morningstar classifications) and fund flows. However, 
they also find that flows respond as much or more to deviations from style category returns and 
conclude that investors may simply focus on the fund’s return derived from its style. Recent 
research incorporates multiple approaches in a “horse race” to determine which models investors 




Even though the relationship between mutual fund performance and flows is complex, a 
manager could use drift as a tool to improve performance and garner flows. However, there are 
costs and benefits associated with using this tool. From the individual manager perspective, 
successfully executing a rotation strategy would result in strong relative performance that in turn 
could lead to the following benefits: higher bonus, reduced career concerns and greater fund assets. 
On the other hand, a poorly executed rotation strategy would result in weak relative performance 
that result in the following costs: declining assets under management and increased career 
concerns. From the individual investor perspective, a successfully executed rotation strategy 
provides the following benefits: potentially lower overall portfolio risk and improved relative 
performance over time. Conversely, a poorly executed strategy has the following costs: 
unanticipated exposures that complicate portfolio construction and poor relative performance. 
 Wermers (2012) invites researchers to explore labor market pressures that may incentivize 
managers to engage in active drift. Recent research supports the assertion that mutual fund 
managers may be motivated to drift by performance and flows, since most receive incentive 
compensation tied to performance and have some portion of their compensation linked to fund 
flows (Chua and Tam, 2020; Ma, Tang, and Gómez, 2019). Despite having both implicit and 
explicit incentives only the most skilled managers are likely to deploy style rotation as a tool given 
the severe consequences of unsuccessful execution. Moreover, TVSR requires not only the ability 
to successfully analyze and select small-cap stocks and large-cap stocks, but to do so in the proper 
proportion at the correct time during an economic cycle. Managers that possess this unique 
combination of skills may be the most effective at generating higher returns and greater flows. 
There are many ways to measure skill. Some of these measures, such as the Sharpe ratio, 
have been used by investors for decades (Sharpe, 1966). More recently, the mutual fund 
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performance literature has offered new measures of identifying manager skill (Amihud and 
Goyenko, 2013; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). A simple measure created by Amihud and Goyenko 
(2013) relies on a fund’s R2, which measures how much of a fund’s return variance is due to the 
returns on a set of risk factors. A low R2 indicates greater selectivity, which is a significant 
predicter of mutual fund performance. More sophisticated approaches use mutual fund holdings, 
such as the Characteristic Selectivity (CS) and Characteristic Timing (CT) measures developed by 
DGTW (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997). The former measures a fund manager’s 
ability to pick stocks that outperform, and the latter measures her ability to time portfolio weights 
across factors. 
I.1 Time-Varying Style Rotation and Small-Cap Managers 
 The mutual fund literature on time-series variation in fund performance describes the 
changing environment in which mutual fund managers must perform their duties during a business 
cycle. Within the mutual fund performance literature, Moskowitz (2000) may be the first to 
consider that managers employ different strategies in recessions and expansions. In a paper 
responding to Wermers (2000), Moskowitz recomputes the performance measures for two 
recessions that occurred during the sample period using NBER business cycle dates and finds that 
active managers do add value during recessions. Moreover, subsequent research also documents 
similar results (Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 2011; Kosowski, 2011).  
 Managers being able to add value during recessions implies the ability to forecast their 
onset. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014), provide an explanation for how a 
manager can anticipate a recession without foreknowledge of the NBER business cycle dates, 
which identify each peak and trough in economic activity after the fact. The authors conclude that 
a manager can forecast macroeconomic variables like GDP by using the same analytical process 
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used to forecast future expected returns for both the markets and companies. They find the most 
highly skilled managers successfully time the market during recessions. These results provide 
additional evidence that mutual fund managers deploy various strategies during different phases 
of the economic cycle and the extent to which a manager engages in a specific strategy during 
recessions is a function of skill. 
 In this study, I use the term time-varying style rotation (TVSR) to describe how certain 
small-cap managers increase large-cap stock holdings in anticipation of a recession. Time variation 
in style performance may provide a motivation for this behavior. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 
(2000) find that “small firm’s risk and expected returns are most strongly affected by variations in 
the underlying state and the rapid increase in the premium on small over large firms’ stock returns 
as recession periods progress…(P 1259)” Comparing the performance of a small-cap and large-
cap index over several periods in and around recessions, Switzer (2010) finds that in the majority 
of cases from 1926 to 2007 small-caps underperformed large-caps during the 12 months prior to 
an economic peak. During the three most recent full recession periods, small-cap stocks also posted 
negative returns. Conversely, in the 12 months following an economic trough small-caps perform 
significantly better than large-caps.  
 TVSR could be considered a form of market timing. Bollen and Busse (2001) were the first 
to provide evidence of significant market timing ability by mutual fund managers using daily data 
instead of monthly data. More recent research builds on this seminal work by analyzing holdings 
as well as returns. Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) create a new market timing variable by measuring 
changes in a mutual fund’s beta, which is estimated using the weighted average of the stock 
holdings’ betas. This approach allows for the isolation of active market timing from ‘artificial 
timing’ effects, which can introduce a source of bias. The authors find evidence of high industry 
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concentration and a tilt toward small-cap stocks within funds that are active market timers. Based 
on further tests using industry betas, they conclude managers engage in “industry rotation” from 
high beta to low beta industries in anticipation of a market decline: “Less cyclical, steadier blue-
chip stocks typically have lower betas, and tilting toward these stocks due to pessimistic market 
views is a textbook example of market timing (p 749).”  
Recent evidence suggests that small-cap managers exploit the opportunity provided by the 
SEC to invest in larger companies. The SEC allows mutual funds to use any “reasonable 
definition” for styles used in fund names (e.g. small-cap) and suggests funds use resources like 
industry indices (SEC, 2001a). In practice, most small-cap managers include both a primary 
benchmark index and the market cap range of that index in the prospectus. Based on my analysis 
of 399 small-cap mutual funds, there is substantial latitude in the way managers select and define 
the benchmark index market capitalization range used to demonstrate compliance with the Names 
Rule (see Appendix B). For example, funds using the Russell 2000 as a benchmark index reflect a 
mean ranging from a lower limit of $56.6 million to an upper limit of $8.1 billion with a maximum 
of $27.3 billion. To put this in context, a 2013 study on small-cap market quality indicates a $2 
billion dividing line between small- and mid-cap market capitalization (Collver, 2014). A May 
2020 calculation by FTSE Russell reflects an upper limit of the Russell 2000 market cap range of 
$4.4 billion. These results suggest that late in the most recent economic cycle prior to the 2020 
recession there was a dramatic increase in the small-cap mutual fund maximum market cap index 
range, which provided the opportunity for these managers to buy mid- and large-cap stocks while 
remaining in compliance with the Names Rule. To the extent managers exhibited similar behavior 
in and around recession periods this could explain how managers engage in TVSR yet avoid the 
ire of the SEC. 
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Even though Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) argue that managers 
possess the tools to forecast recessions, there is no evidence that small-cap managers can do this 
with precision based on the analysis done by Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017). In advance of the 
March 2001 peak, the authors observe that small-cap mutual funds’ average allocation to large-
cap stocks begin to increase in 1998 and peak in 2003. If these managers were able to predict 
recessions with certainty, they would execute rotations into large-cap stocks more quickly. 
I begin by analyzing how the holdings in large-cap stocks by small-cap managers changes 
over the last two full recession periods using the NBER cycle dates (i.e. Mar. 2001-Nov. 2001; 
Dec. 2007-Jun. 2009). The SEC rule change, which reduces the percentage of out of style holdings 
allowed, should have reduced the opportunity for managers to style drift making it more difficult 
to find evidence of this behavior. The first validation test is a time series analysis of the average 
of the large-cap stock holdings across small-cap managers 12 months before and after the peak in 
economic activity (i.e. Mar. 2001 and Dec. 2007). Next, I compare the percentage of TNA in large-
cap stocks held by small-cap managers pre- and post-peak using the monthly average of large-cap 
holdings for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. 
Due to the inability of small-cap managers to anticipate the onset of a recession with precision, I 
test both one-year and two-year periods around the peak. Then I test my hypothesis in a three 
period multi-variate regression framework by regressing the dependent variable percentage of 
holdings in large-cap stocks against two dummy variables and fund characteristics. The results 
provide additional confirmatory evidence that small-cap managers increase their large-cap 
holdings during recessions.  
Having established that on average small-cap managers rotate into large-cap holdings in 
and around recessions, the next question is which managers are likely to do so. Due to the severe 
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consequences of unsuccessful execution only the most skilled managers are likely to deploy style 
rotation as a tool. While there are many approaches developed in the literature to measure skill, 
this study incorporates several measures discussed earlier (i.e. R2 , Sharpe ratio and DGTW CS 
and CT measures). I find some evidence of a positive relation between skill and changes in large-
cap holdings by small-cap managers. 
Using skill as a measure to identify small-cap managers that are likely to rotate into large-
cap stocks in and around recessions, I examine whether managers benefit from this strategy. 
Successfully implementing a rotation strategy means that a manager produces higher returns by 
increasing the amount of large-cap stock held in the fund. Under normal circumstances, investors 
would chase these higher returns and reward the manager with greater flows consistent with the 
well-documented flow-performance relationship. In this situation TVSR acts as an additional  
signal of manager skill to investors and they respond with higher flows. To examine the relation 
between future fund returns and rotation to large-cap stocks, I regress the one-month ahead fund 
return on the change in large-cap holdings in the past. A higher percentage of large-cap holdings 
results in higher future returns over multiple periods in both recession periods. The test for flows 
is similar: regress the future fund flows on the percentage change in large-cap holdings in the past. 
A higher percentage of large-cap holdings results in higher future flows in one period during the 
first recession period and multiple periods during the second recession period. 
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I add to the extant literature 
focusing on style drift in the size dimension. The extant literature focuses on how style factors 
change over time across the entire universe of equity mutual funds (Brown, Harlow, and Zhang, 
2009, 2015; Wermers, 2012). Similar to Wermers (2012), this paper focuses on portfolio holdings 
to assess style drift. However, I narrow my scope of analysis to small-cap equity managers’ 
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behavior around recessions. This is consistent with more recent studies like Cao, Iliev, and 
Velthuis (2017), which focus exclusively on analyzing drift in a single sub asset class (small-cap 
equity). Their results document time variation in large-cap holdings of small-cap managers 
showing the highest allocations in 2002 and 2009 (p 43). I show that large-cap holdings by small-
cap managers spike following the peak in economic activity during the last two recessions. By 
focusing solely on small-cap manager drift around recessions I raise awareness to the impact this 
behavior has on optimal portfolio allocation. 
Next, I provide additional evidence of a characteristic exhibited by small-cap managers 
who drift from their stated styles. Using a transition matrix, Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017) show 
that top decile holders of large-cap stocks tend to remain in the top decile over time suggesting 
certain managers regularly employ this strategy (p 43). I show some evidence that managers with 
greater stock selection skill are more likely to execute this strategy. 
By tying time-series variation in equity style performance to the economic cycle, I 
contribute to the literature on intertemporal variation in mutual fund performance. Much like 
existing literature on mutual fund style drift, studies that distinguish between recession and 
expansion periods also include the entire universe of equity mutual funds in their analysis 
(Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 2014; Kosowski, 2011; Moskowitz, 2000). By 
highlighting that large-cap stocks outperform small-cap stocks going into a recession and the 
reverse occurs following the trough of economic activity (Switzer, 2010), I provide a motivation 
for small-cap manager behavior in time-varying style rotation. This hypothesis is supported by my 
evidence from the 2001-recession that these managers produced higher returns and benefitted from 
higher flows.  
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My results also have implications for investors. The investment management industry 
promotes optimal portfolio allocations based on the Markowitz mean-variance approach (Fisher 
and Statman, 1997). Yet, there is little evidence that investors consistently follow these 
recommendations. Instead, ample evidence in the flow-performance literature shows that investors 
chase past performance. Therefore, investors should be aware how managers are generating this 
performance over the course of an economic cycle. By highlighting how skilled small-cap mutual 
fund managers take advantage of the time-series variation in equity style performance by drifting 
into a higher percentage of large-cap stocks during recessions, my results bring attention to this 
activity. Normative considerations aside, small-cap investors willing to accept deviations from 
optimal portfolio allocations during recessions can identify managers that use this technique most 
effectively. These investors should also be aware, however, that researchers have not yet studied 
the ability of small-cap manages to rotate out of large-cap stocks once the recession has ended. 
Switzer (2010) finds that small-cap stocks tend to significantly outperform large-cap stocks during 
the twelve months following an economic trough. Therefore, small-cap managers that stick to their 
style and do not drift may outperform managers with higher large-cap holdings during this post-
recession period. 
I.2 Hypotheses Development 
Several researchers have posed the question whether funds are able to perform best when 
it matters the most, which is during a recession when market declines reduce wealth (Kosowski, 
2011; Moskowitz, 2000). Since small-cap stocks tend to underperform large-cap stocks during 
recessions, investors should be aware of how small-cap managers may rotate into large-cap stocks 
to improve performance. Kim and Burnie (2002) explore the relationship between the small firm 
effect and the economic cycle and find during periods of weak economic activity small company 
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stocks do not perform as well as large company stocks. Small firms are less productive (low ROA) 
and have higher leverage than large firms, which cause them to struggle during recessions. Switzer 
(2010) also examines the same relationship between the small firm effect and the economic cycle 
and finds similar results: small-cap stocks did not perform as well as large-cap stocks in the 12 
months prior to the peak in economic activity. Finally, Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) show that mutual 
fund managers rotate out of stocks in high beta industries into stocks in low beta industries, which 
supports anecdotal evidence these managers do so in expectation of a market decline. This research 
supports a motivation for small-cap mutual fund managers to engage in TVSR by increasing their 
large-cap stock holdings in and around recessions. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The peak in small-cap manager large-cap stock holdings will occur following the 
peak in economic activity. 
 
 Due to the risks associated with attempting a TVSR strategy, not every small-cap manager 
will attempt to use it. Accurately forecasting the duration of economic cycles is difficult and can 
result in false positives (forecasting a peak that does not occur) or false negatives (failing to 
forecast a peak when it occurs). The ability to successfully execute this strategy requires that a 
manager possess two types of skill: first, to forecast the onset of a recession and second, the ability 
to pick large-cap stocks as well as small-cap stocks. Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017) find a 
relationship between both the size and age of a small-cap fund and its allocation to large-cap stocks 
(p 49). These results imply experienced managers that have successfully grown their funds may 
be inclined to use this strategy. In this study I use several measures found in the literature to serve 
as a proxy for fund manager skill. By looking at the relationship between these skill measures and 
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large-cap stock holdings, I test whether the more highly skilled managers are the ones using this 
drift tool the most. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Skilled small-cap managers are more likely to increase large-cap stock holdings 
during recession periods. 
 
 To the extent that skilled small-cap managers are more likely to engage in TVSR, we 
should see a relationship between holding higher percentages of large-cap stocks and performance. 
Despite the risks, these managers respond to the implicit incentive of increased flows.4 Chua and 
Tam (2020) study the motivation for intentional style drift and find that funds engaging in drift 
experience greater inflows. Investors appear to view TVSR as an additional signal of managerial 
ability and respond with greater flows. Like performance, I expect to find a relationship between 
flows and rotation into large-cap stocks by skilled managers. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Skilled small-cap managers, on average, are more likely to increase large-cap 
stocks during recession periods leading to better performance and greater flows. 
 
___________________________________ 
4  In addition to implicit incentives, mutual fund managers also have explicit incentives. In a recent study of 
over 4,500 mutual funds, the majority of these contracts contained a bonus tied to investment performance (Ma, Tang, 





II.1 Data Sources 
Mutual fund information and holdings data are obtained from the Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) site and merged using MFLINKS. WRDS provides access to both the Center 
for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database and the 
Thomson Reuters s12 database. Following Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017), this study uses two 
CRSP database search methods to identify domestic small-cap equity mutual funds: CRSP Style 
Code of EDCS and the term “small” in the name. Since 1998, the style codes are determined by 
Lipper Objective Codes.5 The objective codes are assigned based on the investment emphasis 
language listed in the prospectus. For example, a mutual fund manager that lists small-cap stocks 
as their investment emphasis in their prospectus has an objective code of SG. Based on the CRSP 
Style Code methodology, all funds with a Lipper Objective Code of SG are coded EDCS (Equity, 
Domestic, Cap-based, Small-Cap). Funds that included the term “small” in the name were also 
selected, which captures those with style codes other than EDCS. 
This study also applies filters like Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis (2017) that ensure only 
actively managed domestic small-cap equity mutual funds are included in the sample. For 
example, CRSP provides an identifier that captures several approaches (i.e. index-based, pure 
index and enhanced index), which facilitates filtering out index funds. Even after all filters are 
applied, a visual examination reveals the need to perform a manual scrub to construct an accurate 
sample. This process involves several steps as described in Appendix C. Researchers should be 
aware of the holdings-based codes available to track style changes to determine if manual  
___________________________________ 




adjustments are necessary to identify their topic of interest more accurately. For this study, the 
EDCS code period was the primary determinant of holdings inclusion. 
Classification of holdings into either large-cap or small-cap is based on the initial step of 
Russell’s annual reconstitution methodology prior to 2007: each June the top 1,000 stocks ranked 
by total market capitalization are classified as large-cap and the next 2,000 stocks by market cap 
are small-cap. In 2007, Russell changed its methodology to include a process called banding 
designed to reduce turnover. By using the same simple classification approach for both recession  
periods, this study avoids any issue associated with changing reconstitution methodologies over 
the two sample periods. 
Following Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014), I use NBER business 
cycle dating conventions whereby a peak indicates the onset of a recession. My study includes the 
last two full recession periods that began in March 2001 and December 2007. 
Since my focus is on manager behavior around recessions, my final sample period is from 
March 1999 to March 2003 and from December 2005 to December 2009, during which there exist 
639 small-cap mutual funds. 
II.2 Variable Construction 
 For fund characteristics, I aggregate all share classes at the fund level. TNA is aggregate 
total net assets ($mm) across all share classes one month before a filing date. Age is the number of 
years since the fund’s oldest share class is launched. I use the natural logarithms of TNA and Age 
in the empirical analyses. Return-based variables, turnover ratio (Turnover), expense ratio 
(Expense), 12b1 fee (fee12b1), and management fee (mgmtfee) are the TNA-weighted average 
across all fund share classes and scaled to percentage points.  
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Large-cap stocks consist of the top 1,000 stocks ranked by total market capitalization. 
Large-Cap Holdings are the large-cap holdings by small-cap managers in each month. LC Change 
Past 1Y (LC Change Past 2Y) is the change in Large-Cap Holdings over the past one year (two 
years). LC Change Next 1Y (LC Change Next 2Y) is the change in Large-Cap Holdings over the 
next one year (two years). AUM is the natural logarithm of the total net assets. Expense is the 
expense ratio. #ShareClass is the number of share classes of each fund. Past Return is the monthly 
fund return in the previous month. Turnover  is the turnover ratio. R2_Skill is 1 – R2 where R2 is 
calculated from the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model using returns in the past 24 months. 
Past Adj. Return is peer-adjusted Past Return. Past Alpha is the intercept of regressing Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model using returns in the past 24 months. Sharpe Ratio is the mean 
monthly excess return divided by the standard deviation of monthly excess return in the past 24 
months. CS and CT are characteristic selectivity and characteristic timing measures documented 
in Daniel et al. (1997). Risk is the monthly change in the standard deviation of daily returns in each 
month. Systematic Risk is the monthly change in the beta on the market factor from regressing 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model using daily returns in each month. Idiosyncratic Risk is 
the monthly change in square root of the residual from regressing Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model using daily returns in each month. Return is the peer-adjusted return in the next 1, 3, 6, or 
12 months. Flow is calculated as in Sirri and Tufano (1998): (TNAi,t – TNAi, t-1)*(1+Ri,t)/ (TNAi, 
t-1) and is peer-adjusted in the 1, 3, 6, or 12 months.. CAPM Alpha/FF3 Alpha/FF4 Alpha is the 
difference between the monthly excess return and the expected return, where expected return is 
calculated using betas from regressing CAPM/Fama-French three-factor model/ Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model using returns in the past 24 months. For all variables using past 24 
monthly returns, twelve valid data points are required. 
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 Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the variable measurement periods used to test small-cap 
manager’s style rotation behavior and manager skill, respectively. The first is a three-period 
comparison test using two dummy variables, which is described in more detail in Section III.1. To 
test manager skill, I use an event study approach, which is described in more detail Section III.2. 





 My analysis begins with a review of how small-cap mutual fund manager holdings change 
during recession periods. 
III.1 Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers Around Recession Peak 
Figures 2A and 2B document how small-cap manager allocations to large-cap stocks 
change around recession periods. For the first recession period (peak=Mar. 2001) small-cap 
manager allocations to large-cap stocks spiked in June 2001, just three months after the peak in 
economic activity. During the second recession period (peak=Dec. 2007) the spike occurred in 
June 2008, which was six months after the peak in economic activity. Cao, Iliev, and Velthuis 
(2017) also observed similar spikes in small-cap manager allocations to large-cap stocks with the 
highest allocations in 2002 and 2009 (pp 45-46). 
[Insert Figures 2A and 2B here] 
The results of the first test of small-cap manager rotation behavior in and around recessions 
are presented in Table 2. The monthly average of large-cap holdings is compared for two 24-month 
periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. For example, for the first 
recession period (peak=Mar. 2001) the pre-peak large-cap holdings were 18% and the post-peak 
large-cap holdings were 23.5% resulting in a 5.5% difference, which is statistically significant. 
The difference between the pre- and post-peak holdings during the second recession period 
(peak=Dec. 2007) of 4.9% is also statistically different from zero.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
An additional test of small-cap manager rotation behavior in and around recessions 
incorporates a three-period comparison using two dummy variables. The three 24-month 
comparison periods consist of the following: a first period covering the 25th to 48th month prior to 
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the peak in economic activity, a second period covering the 24 months prior to the peak and a third 
period covering the 24 months following the peak. The variable Pre-peak regresses the dependent 
variable percentage of holdings in large-cap stocks against a post-peak dummy variable to compare 
the first and second periods. The variable Post-peak regresses the dependent variable percentage 
of holdings in large-cap stocks against a post-peak dummy variable to compare the second and 
third periods. This three-period comparison provides more clarity regarding when small-cap 
managers increase their holdings in large-cap stocks. Table 3 Panel A reflects the results using the 
NBER business cycle peak in March 2001, which indicate that small-cap managers did not rotate 
into large-cap stocks significantly between the first and second periods. However, there is evidence 
of this rotation behavior between the second and third periods (before and after the peak in 
economic activity). 
Table 3 Panel B reflect the results of the same regression in Panel A using the NBER 
business cycle peak in December 2007. The results reflect a different pattern than that observed 
during the first recession period due to the proximity of the sample recession periods. By starting 
the first measurement period 48 months prior to the peak in economic activity of the second 
recession (December 2003), we capture elevated levels of large-cap holdings. Since the first 
sample recession period ends in November 2001, small-cap managers had not yet begun to 
substantially rotate back into small-cap stocks. However, since they do reduce large-cap holdings 
by the end of the first measurement period and then begin to increase large-cap holdings by the 
end of the second measurement period, we get significant results for the Pre-peak regression. The 
Post-peak regression results were qualitatively the same as those from the first regression. The 
results from these two tests are consistent with my first hypothesis that the peak in small-cap 
mutual fund managers’ holdings in large-cap stocks follows the peak in economic activity. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
III.2 Manager Skill and Change in Large-Cap Holdings 
Successfully executing a rotation strategy in and around recessions comes with certain 
costs and benefits. Poor execution of this strategy could result in weak performance relative to 
peers, declining assets under management, and increased career concerns. Managers who are 
willing to put their career on the line are more likely to be confident in their ability to successfully 
execute this strategy. Therefore, we would expect to see a relationship between skill and higher 
large-cap holdings. I use an event study approach to examine the relationship between skill and 
drift to large-cap holdings. First, I regress the change in the percentage of holdings in large-cap 
stocks for both a 12-month and 24-month period following each peak in economic activity on 
various skill measures estimated 24 months during the Pre-Peak period (see Figure 1B). I interact 
the change in large-cap holdings with the Post dummy variable in two 24-month periods before 
and after each peak in economic activity.  
Overall, the results for the first recession period indicate on average more highly skilled 
managers hold larger amounts of large-cap stocks after the peak in economic activity compared 
with the period prior to the economic peak with the CS measure only showing evidence during the 
one-year future change period. One exception is the CT measure (Table 9), which shows a negative 
relationship. This result is intuitive in that TVSR involves a manager trading out of an investment 
style (i.e. size). These results provide evidence to support my second hypothesis that skilled 
managers engage in this rotation strategy and do so up to 24 months following the peak in 
economic activity. 
The results for the second recession period are mixed with only the R2_skill and Sharpe 
ratio skill measures indicating a significant relationship between skill and higher large-cap 
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holdings. Overall, I find some evidence that, on average, skilled managers are more likely to rotate 
their holdings into large-cap stocks in and around recession periods. Moreover, this rotation 
behavior may act as a signal sent by the skilled managers to investors.  
[Insert Tables 4-9 here] 
III.3 Future Performance, Future Flows and Change in Large-Cap Holdings 
 Having found some evidence that on average more highly skilled managers hold larger 
amounts of large-cap stocks after the peak in economic activity compared with the period prior to 
the economic peak, is there evidence these managers are able to take advantage of the time-series 
variation in large-cap stocks to improve performance and garner greater flows vis a vis their less 
skilled counterparts. During the first recession period, there is evidence in most of the performance 
periods of this relationship. The results in Tables 10 Panel A and 11 Panel A reflect that funds with 
a greater increase in the percentage of large-cap holdings in the past have both higher future returns 
and flows over different horizons ranging from one month to twelve months, which confirms my 
third hypothesis. The economic magnitude is also significant. For example, in the first recession 
period a 10% drift to large-cap holdings increases performance by 0.3% in the following month. 
In the second recession period, a 10% drift attracts flows by 7.7% in the following month, after 
controlling for the contemporaneous return. 
However, the results for the second recession period in Tables 10 Panel B and 11 Panel B 
do not provide consistent evidence in support of these relationships. Even though investors observe 
the change in large-cap holdings and reward managers with greater flows, the managers do not 
actually deliver better performance. One possible explanation for why this strategy provided no 
additional benefit is that unlike the first recession period when large-cap stocks performed well, 
these stocks may not have performed well during the second recession period. For this strategy to 
30 
 
remain successful, small-cap managers would also need to reduce their holdings in large-cap 
stocks as the economy improved. If this did not happen, investors in these funds may have 
experienced poor relative performance and disappointment with funds that were unable to 
successfully rotate back into small-cap stocks in time. 
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 here] 
III.4 Robustness Tests 
 I perform several additional tests to support my conclusions. First, a possible alternative 
explanation of the observed results is that mutual fund managers use TVSR as a risk management 
tool. The results in Tables 12-14 do not support a relationship between past shifts into large-cap 
stocks and future risk taking. The results are consistent across total risk, systematic risk, and 
idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, these results do not support the argument that small-cap managers 
are rotating into large-cap stocks for the purpose of risk management. 
 Another question regarding how small-cap managers use style rotation is whether there is 
persistence in style drift. Table 15 shows no persistence, which supports the argument that style 
rotation is deployed in and around recessions by small-cap managers to improve performance. 
These managers would have an incentive to reduce large-cap holdings post-recession, based on 
the tendency of small-cap stocks to outperform large-cap stocks following an economic trough 
(Switzer, 2010). 
 Next, I perform a time series placebo test to determine if the relationship holds during 
periods other than recessions. Using a pseudo-peak of Dec. 2005, I compare large-cap holdings 
before and after the peak. This period was randomly chosen to avoid overlap with the study test 
periods. The results in Table 16, using a fictitious recession period, show that small-cap managers 
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did not rotate into large-cap holdings post-peak. This evidence shows that my results are unlikely 
to be spurious and driven by data snooping. 
 Finally, to further explore the relation between past changes in large-cap holdings and 
future performance I consider alternative measures for performance. While Table 10 reflects 
better future returns during the first recession period compared to the second recession period, 
Table 17 indicates small-cap managers that rotate into large-cap holdings do not generate alpha 
during the first recession period. However, these managers do generate positive raw returns and 
abnormal returns, measured by CAPM alpha, Fama-French three factor alpha, and Fama-French-
Carhart four factor alpha during the second recession period. This ostensibly conflicting result 
could be an artifact of the test design, whereby the results in Table 10 are based on peer adjusted 
returns and the results in Table 17 are based on raw returns and alphas. Consistent with Table 10, 
the raw returns in Table 17 are better during the first recession period compared with the second 
recession period. 




IV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The question of how to evaluate whether a mutual fund manager adds value remains 
unanswered in the mutual fund performance literature. A recent strand argues for conditioning 
evaluation periods on the economic cycle to determine if mutual fund managers add value during 
recessions when investors may experience reduced incomes and asset values (Kacperczyk, Van 
Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 2011; Kosowski, 2011; Moskowitz, 2000; Wermers, 2000). Time-
series variation in equity style performance may provide an incentive for some managers to use 
style rotation as a tool to improve performance or reduce risk during recessions. An example of 
this style performance variation is the tendency for small-cap stocks to underperform large-cap 
stocks in the twelve months prior to an economic peak (Switzer, 2010). It is this specific 
performance tendency that may motivate small-cap managers to increase their large-cap stock 
holdings in anticipation of a recession. In this paper, I provide evidence that small-cap managers 
rotate into large-cap stocks after the peak in economic activity in each of the last two recession 
periods identified by the NBER cycle dates. 
Due to the risks involved with this strategy not all managers will attempt to execute it. 
While small-cap managers are skilled in selecting small-cap stocks, not every manager is an 
effective large-cap stock picker as well. I show some evidence that skilled managers rotate their 
holdings the most into large-cap stocks and do so up to 24 months following the peak in economic 
activity. Finally, managers are willing to assume the risks associated with this strategy to improve 
returns and increase flows. We do observe that funds with a greater increase in the percentage of 
large-cap holdings in the past have both higher future returns and flows during the first recession. 
During the second recession, managers are again rewarded with higher flows even though they do 
not deliver higher returns. Having been conditioned in the past, investors respond to increasing 
levels of large-cap holdings as either a signal of manager skill and/or improved future performance. 
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The lack of improved returns during the second recession may be due to large-cap stocks not 
performing as well during the second recession as they did during the first. 
This paper investigates the time-varying style rotation of small-cap mutual fund managers 
around the peak in economic activity during the last two recession periods. The results indicate a 
relationship between fund manager skill and shifts into large-cap stocks. Future research should 
investigate small-cap manager behavior beyond the trough in economic activity. Switzer (2010) 
finds that small-cap stocks outperform large-cap stocks following the trough in economic activity, 
which provides an incentive for small-cap managers that rotated into large-cap stocks during the 
recession to rotate back into small-cap stocks. Another opportunity for future research is to include 
the most recent recession period that began in February 2020, to provide additional confirmatory 
evidence that the observed relationships are robust. 
 These findings also have several implications for practitioners. First, portfolio construction 
techniques designed to create an optimal portfolio allocation should consider the time-varying 
properties of style drift. Investment professionals are familiar with the need to periodically 
rebalance portfolios to bring allocations in line with strategic weights. In addition, tactical 
adjustments away from these strategic weights may also allow investors to capitalize on short-term 
opportunities. The style drift decisions of individual managers have implications for both 
rebalancing and tactical adjustment decisions. 
 Consideration should not only be given to identifying and monitoring changes in manager 
style drift, but also to strategies designed to adjust misallocations. Investment professionals are 
trained not to rely exclusively on a manager’s declared asset class and style and instead check for 
style drift by periodically evaluating exposures based on holdings. However, there are costs 
associated with addressing misallocations by realigning a portfolio with its strategic allocations 
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(e.g. transactions costs, capital gains, etc.). Therefore, portfolio realignment should be considered 
in the context of the economic cycle and market environment. For example, the tendency of some 
small-cap managers to increase large-cap holdings in advance of a recession is consistent with 
standard industry guidance to reduce overall portfolio exposure to cyclical exposures that perform 
poorly during a recession. However, these managers may not rotate quickly back into small-cap 
stocks risking underperformance. As a result, investment professionals may consider the addition 






Appendix A – Institutional Details 
 
The SEC refers to a manager’s style designation as a fund’s “investment emphasis” (SEC, 2001b). If a 
mutual fund name includes a term that implies a particular investment emphasis, the SEC requires that the 
majority of that fund’s assets must be consistent with the fund name. While the SEC encourages investors 
not to select a fund based solely on its name, Congress understood the importance of fund name accuracy 
and gave the SEC authority to police investment company names under the Investment Company Act of 
1940. In 2001, due to continued concerns over misleading names, the SEC issued rule 35d-1 (“Names 
Rule”) increasing the percentage of assets an investment company must hold in a manner consistent with 
the fund name from 65% to at least 80%. However, the SEC provides funds with two exceptions to the 80% 
requirement: “temporary defensive positions” and “circumstances beyond its control.” The former 
exception relates to the “under normal circumstances” standard whereby funds may deviate from the rule 
to protect their portfolio from losses caused by significant events such as “market, economic, political or 
other conditions” or large inflows/outflows but are expected to return to compliance after six months. The 
latter exception relates to changes in market cap and absolves funds from having to immediately sell a 
holding as it increases beyond its investment emphasis. In the case of a small-cap fund, this exception 
allows the manager to hold stocks as the market cap rises into the mid-cap or large-cap range (referred to 




Appendix B – Market Capitalization Ranges of Small-Cap Managers 
 
This Appendix shows the results of an analysis of small-cap mutual fund prospectus information for funds 
with a stated index of Russell 2000, Russell 2000 Growth and Russell 2000 Value. Even though Russell 
publishes market cap ranges in May of each year following its annual reconstitution, managers choose 
different dates resulting in a variety of market cap range values. For example, funds using the Russell 2000 
as a benchmark index reflect a mean ranging from a lower limit of $56.6 million to an upper limit of $8.1 
billion with a maximum of $27.3 billion. 
 
Market-Cap Range Summary Statistics by Benchmark 
  Panel A Panel B Panel C 














#Obs 48 30 173 131 65 37 
Mean 9.41 22.79 8.11 56.55 6.09 59.11 
Std. Deviation 6.19 28.15 3.27 119.67 1.92 119.10 
Minimum 2.50 .0022 1.00 .0059 1.00 0.46 
25% 5.93 11.73 6.30 11.90 5.05 15.00 
50% 8.29 13.00 8.30 13.00 6.20 24.50 
75% 10.34 27.98 9.16 39.64 6.80 32.90 
Maximum 27.30 152.30 27.30 821.00 16.00 666.00 
Range 24.80 152.30 26.30 820.99 15.00 665.54 
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Appendix C – Manual Data Scrub Process 
 
The following data for Moneta Fund was provided by CRSP with the exclusion of the Morningstar Category 
classification history. The manual data scrub process includes the following steps. First, spot checking 
individual funds based on names that did not include “small” or any related term. For example, the name 
Moneta Fund does not indicate a small-cap investment emphasis, even though it has a style code of EDCS 
for a portion of its existence. Next, review holdings data to identify funds with multiple companies at the 
high end of the large-cap range (e.g. Apple and Microsoft). Continuing with the Moneta Fund example, 
during the latter years of the period when the fund was coded EDCS the holdings reflect a higher percentage 
of large-cap stocks. To investigate fund changes in investment emphasis over time, CRSP provides code 
history to facilitate tracking these changes. After 1998, the Lipper Objective Code is the sole determinate 
of a CRSP Style Code shown in the highlighted section. While Lipper also produces a Classification Code 
based on a fund’s actual holdings, CRSP does not incorporate this code into its style codes. Like the 
Morningstar Style Box methodology, each fund is categorized based on market-cap and style. With respect 
to market-cap, the majority (at least 75%) of a fund’s weighted equity assets determine the classification. 
For the Moneta Fund three of four ratings, Lipper Objective Name, CRSP Style Code and Morningstar 
Category classification, reflect a small-cap focus between 12/31/1998 and 12/30/2001. However, after 
12/31/2001 both holdings-based indicators, the Lipper Classification Code and Morningstar Category 
classification, changed from small-cap growth to mid-cap growth. Yet the prospectus-based Lipper 
Objective Code remained SG for small-cap stocks and the CRSP Style Code followed suit (EDCS). Again 
on 06/30/2003, Lipper changed its classification code from mid-cap growth to multi-cap growth. Both the 
Lipper and Morningstar categories changed on 12/31/2003, from mid-cap growth to multi-cap core and 
large-cap blend, respectively. The Moneta Fund example illustrates how a fund manager may migrate most 
of its holdings into another investment emphasis before changing its prospectus. Even though the holdings-
based indicators changed from small-cap to mid-cap on 12/31/2001, the Lipper Objective Code remained 
the same until about 11/15/2013 (indicating a change in the prospectus). One final step in the manual scrub 
process involved the identification and removal of funds not labelled index funds but contain hundreds of 
stocks with little active management or tracking error to the index. For example, the DFA (Dimensional 







Appendix C (continued) – Coding Example 




















Code Morningstar Category 

























Funds MLCE MLCE 
SMALL-CAP 





Growth Funds MLGE MLGE 
SMALL-CAP 





Growth Funds LCGE LCGE 
GROWTH 





Funds LCCE LCCE 
GROWTH 





Growth Funds LCGE LCGE 
GROWTH 





Funds LCCE LCCE 
GROWTH 





Growth Funds LCGE LCGE 
GROWTH 






Appendix D – Tables and Figures 
Variable Measurement Periods 
Figure 1A: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This figure shows the calculation periods for small-cap mutual fund managers’ change in large-cap holdings 
(see Table 3 for variable definitions). 
 
Dummy values: 
First Period  post = 0, pre = 1 
Second Period  post = 0, pre = 0 
Third Period  post = 1, pre = 0 
 
Figure 1B: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ Stock 
Selectivity 
This figure shows the calculation periods for skill measures: Past Alpha, Past Adj. Return, R2_Skill, Sharpe 
Ratio, CS, and CT (see Tables 4-9 for variable definitions). 
 
Dummy values: 
Pre-peak, pre-event Period  post = 0 






Figure 2A: Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: First Recession Period 
This table reports the mean percentage in large-cap holdings across all 639 small-cap mutual funds in the 
sample. The observation period encompasses 12 months prior to and 12 months following the NBER 




Figure 2B: Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Second Recession Period 
This table reports the mean percentage in large-cap holdings across all 639 small-cap mutual funds in the 
sample. The observation period encompasses 12 months prior to and 12 months following the NBER 












































Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the 639 small-cap mutual funds used in the regressions. The 
sample period is from March 1999 to March 2003 (first recession) and from December 2005 to December 
2009 (second recession). Large-cap stocks consist of the top 1,000 stocks ranked by total market 
capitalization. Large-Cap Holdings are the large-cap holdings by small-cap managers in each month. LC 
Change Past 1Y (LC Change Past 2Y) is the change in Large-Cap Holdings over the past one year (two 
years). LC Change Next 1Y (LC Change Next 2Y) is the change in Large-Cap Holdings over the next one 
year (two years). AUM is the natural logarithm of the total net assets. Expense is the expense ratio. 
#ShareClass is the number of share classes of each fund. Past Return is the monthly fund return in the 
previous month. Turnover  is the turnover ratio. R2_Skill is 1 – R2 where R2 is calculated from the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model using returns in the past 24 months. Past Adj. Return is peer-adjusted 
Past Return. Past Alpha is the intercept of regressing Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model using returns 
in the past 24 months. Sharpe Ratio is the mean monthly excess return divided by the standard deviation of 
monthly excess return in the past 24 months. CS and CT are characteristic selectivity and characteristic 
timing measures documented in Daniel et al. (1997). Risk is the monthly change in the standard deviation 
of daily returns in each month. Systematic Risk is the monthly change in the beta on the market factor from 
regressing Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model using daily returns in each month. Idiosyncratic Risk is 
the monthly change in square root of the residual from regressing Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model 
using daily returns in each month. Return is the peer-adjusted return in the next 1, 3, 6, or 12 months. Flow 
is calculated using the formula found in Sirri and Tufano (1998): (TNAi,t – TNAi, t-1)*(1+Ri,t)/ (TNAi, t-1) 
and is peer-adjusted in the 1, 3, 6, or 12 months.. CAPM Alpha/FF3 Alpha/FF4 Alpha is the difference 
between the monthly excess return and the expected return, where expected return is calculated using betas 
from regressing CAPM/Fama-French three-factor model/ Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model using 
returns in the past 24 months. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Mean Median Std P25 P75 N 
              
Large-Cap Holdings 0.184 0.139 0.173 0.060 0.254 33,503 
LC Change Past 1Y 0.020 0.010 0.091 -0.026 0.063 26,597 
LC Change Past 2Y 0.027 0.015 0.119 -0.034 0.085 23,927 
LC Change Next 1Y 0.016 0.008 0.095 -0.032 0.061 27,072 
LC Change Next 2Y 0.019 0.010 0.127 -0.047 0.084 25,560 
AUM 5.026 5.130 1.726 3.854 6.221 31,822 
Expense 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.016 30,672 
#ShareClass 2.676 2.000 1.791 1.000 4.000 31,828 
Past Return 0.000 0.006 0.076 -0.040 0.042 31,828 
Turnover  0.700 0.780 6.147 0.470 1.290 30,909 
R2_Skill  0.105 0.080 0.091 0.049 0.127 31,997 
Past Adj. Return 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.004 0.003 31,997 
Past Alpha 0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.003 31,997 
Sharpe Ratio 0.036 0.056 0.217 -0.130 0.204 31,997 
CS -0.001 0.000 0.028 -0.012 0.011 30,946 
CT 0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.003 23,982 




Systematic Risk -0.019 0.000 4.302 -0.122 0.119 30,287 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.001 0.000 0.135 -0.001 0.001 30,273 
Return-1 mo. 0.000 -0.001 0.606 -0.015 0.013 32,858 
Return-3 mo. 0.000 -0.002 1.068 -0.030 0.023 31,823 
Return-6 mo. 0.000 -0.005 1.510 -0.054 0.034 31,823 
Return-12 mo. -0.059 -0.096 1.089 -0.219 0.035 31,823 
Flow-1 mo. 0.000 -0.005 3.658 -0.027 0.029 32,808 
Flow-3 mo. 0.000 -0.008 5.861 -0.075 0.202 32,851 
Flow-6 mo. 0.000 0.007 8.038 -0.138 0.372 32,883 
Flow-12 mo. 0.244 0.009 5.888 -0.206 0.657 32,851 
Raw Return 0.005 0.006 0.610 -0.038 0.042 32,858 
CAPM Alpha 0.003 0.000 0.048 -0.019 0.021 30,791 
FF3 Alpha 0.000 -0.001 0.047 -0.014 0.013 30,791 
FF4 Alpha 0.000 -0.001 0.049 -0.014 0.013 30,791 





Table 2: Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Pre- and Post-Peak 
This table shows the difference between the monthly average of large-cap holdings for two 24-month 
periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Large-cap Holdings 
  Pre-peak Post-peak Post - Pre 
2001 
Recession 
0.180 0.235 0.055*** 
  (5.39) 
2008 
Recession 
0.143 0.192 0.049*** 




Table 3: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table reports the large-cap holdings by small-cap managers for three 24-month periods: a first period 
covering the 25th to 48th month prior to the peak in economic activity, a second period covering the 24 
months prior to the peak and a third period covering the 24 months following the peak. Post-peak is an 
indicator variable equal to one if it is in the third time period and zero otherwise. Pre-peak is an indicator 
variable equal to one if it is in the first time period and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Large Cap Holding 
          
Post-peak 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 
 (8.62) (10.22) (7.69) (9.44) 
Pre-peak 0.011* -0.001 0.011 0.002 
 (1.87) (-0.28) (1.44) (0.35) 
AUM   0.018*** -0.002 
   (4.79) (-0.48) 
#ShareClass   -0.007* 0.009* 
   (-1.73) (1.85) 
Past Return   -0.049*** -0.046*** 
   (-5.77) (-7.88) 
Turnover    0.000 -0.000 
   (0.09) (-1.08) 
Expense   1.218 -0.956 
   (1.04) (-0.74) 
     
Observations 18,377 18,375 15,265 15,263 
R-squared 0.018 0.725 0.058 0.742 
Fund FE No Yes No Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Large Cap Holding 
          
Post-peak 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 
 (11.85) (14.96) (13.44) (14.84) 
Pre-peak 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 
 (8.38) (9.40) (9.23) (9.43) 
AUM   0.026*** 0.011*** 
   (5.88) (3.41) 
#ShareClass   -0.007* -0.002 




Past Return   0.077** 0.064* 
   (2.13) (1.86) 
Turnover    0.000 0.001*** 
   (0.10) (3.46) 
Expense   3.075*** 1.196* 
   (8.16) (1.72) 
     
Observations 28,155 28,146 25,902 25,897 
R-squared 0.014 0.841 0.082 0.848 




Table 4: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ Stock 
Selectivity (using four-factor alpha) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in stock selectivity. Each month, the skill variable is measured for the prior 24-month 
period. The skill measure, Past Alpha, is calculated using the four-factor formula found in Carhart (1997). 
The dummy variable Post creates a time series comparison before and after the peak in economic activity 
for each recession. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Past Alpha × Post 1.540*** 1.319*** 2.632*** 2.389*** 
 (5.81) (5.03) (8.08) (7.57) 
Post -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.086*** -0.083*** 
 (-13.94) (-11.49) (-34.80) (-30.56) 
Past Alpha -0.679*** -0.473*** -1.632*** -1.251*** 
 (-3.63) (-2.58) (-5.60) (-4.58) 
AUM  0.001  -0.015*** 
  (0.27)  (-5.50) 
# Share Class  -0.009***  -0.004 
  (-3.61)  (-1.49) 
Past Return  0.053***  0.073*** 
  (4.01)  (4.15) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000 
  (1.41)  (0.31) 
Expense  -0.526  -1.045 
  (-0.66)  (-0.97) 
     
Observations 10,171 9,722 9,733 9,332 
R-squared 0.231 0.227 0.435 0.445 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Past Alpha × Post -0.359 -0.907** -1.825*** -1.949*** 
 (-0.98) (-2.44) (-3.40) (-3.50) 
Post 0.016*** 0.013*** -0.061*** -0.066*** 
 (10.84) (7.60) (-31.20) (-30.25) 




 (2.13) (2.91) (1.44) (1.45) 
AUM  0.005***  -0.001 
  (2.64)  (-0.35) 
# Share Class  0.002  0.009*** 
  (1.29)  (5.25) 
Past Return  -0.175***  -0.250*** 
  (-15.45)  (-16.35) 
Turnover  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (-2.86)  (-3.06) 
Expense  -0.750***  -0.227 
  (-3.04)  (-0.88) 
     
Observations 15,164 14,645 14,203 13,699 
R-squared 0.131 0.153 0.250 0.263 






Table 5: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ Stock 
Selectivity (using peer adjusted performance) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in stock selectivity for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and 
following the peak. The skill measure, Past Adj. Return, is peer adjusted for the average return of other 
funds in the same month. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Past Adj. Return × Post 0.434** 0.398** 0.555** 0.517* 
 (2.36) (2.07) (2.14) (1.93) 
Post -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.080*** -0.078*** 
 (-12.66) (-10.44) (-33.11) (-29.34) 
Past Adj. Return -0.263** -0.265** -0.808*** -0.674*** 
 (-2.15) (-2.11) (-5.02) (-4.12) 
AUM  0.002  -0.010*** 
  (1.02)  (-3.29) 
# Share Class  -0.010***  -0.006** 
  (-4.08)  (-2.31) 
Past Return  0.057***  0.083*** 
  (4.32)  (5.32) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000 
  (1.37)  (0.25) 
Expense  -0.739  -1.571 
  (-0.92)  (-1.45) 
     
Observations 10,171 9,722 9,733 9,332 
R-squared 0.225 0.223 0.430 0.440 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Past Adj. Return × Post -1.404*** -1.803*** -4.071*** -4.357*** 
 (-4.75) (-5.81) (-9.30) (-8.84) 
Post 0.017*** 0.014*** -0.058*** -0.062*** 
 (11.18) (8.46) (-30.22) (-28.41) 
Past Adj. Return -0.097 -0.049 0.080 0.119 




AUM  0.007***  0.005* 
  (3.96)  (1.87) 
# Share Class  0.002  0.009*** 
  (1.20)  (5.02) 
Past Return  -0.174***  -0.244*** 
  (-15.39)  (-16.20) 
Turnover  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (-3.10)  (-3.36) 
Expense  -0.869***  -0.580** 
  (-3.52)  (-2.22) 
     
Observations 15,164 14,645 14,203 13,699 
R-squared 0.133 0.155 0.258 0.271 






Table 6: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ Stock 
Selectivity (using (1- R2)) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in stock selectivity for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and 
following the peak. The skill measure, R2_Skill, is calculated as in Amihud and Goyenko (2013): (1- R2). 
All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by 
fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
R2_Skill × Post 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.055** 0.051** 
 (3.96) (3.11) (2.32) (2.01) 
Post -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.089*** -0.086*** 
 (-10.94) (-9.21) (-21.09) (-18.93) 
R2_Skill 0.152*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.174*** 
 (9.65) (10.16) (8.36) (8.34) 
AUM  0.002  -0.014*** 
  (0.73)  (-4.98) 
# Share Class  -0.009***  -0.006** 
  (-3.92)  (-2.17) 
Past Return  0.039***  0.057*** 
  (2.89)  (3.53) 
Turnover  0.000*  0.000 
  (1.75)  (0.68) 
Expense  -0.528  -1.580 
  (-0.66)  (-1.47) 
     
Observations 10,171 9,722 9,733 9,332 
R-squared 0.242 0.241 0.437 0.448 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
R2_Skill × Post 0.251*** 0.232*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 
 (9.00) (7.99) (3.48) (2.74) 
Post -0.001 -0.004* -0.062*** -0.067*** 
 (-0.42) (-1.67) (-22.41) (-22.39) 
R2_Skill 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.288*** 0.293*** 
 (5.14) (5.84) (11.81) (11.45) 
AUM  -0.001  -0.007*** 




# Share Class  0.003**  0.010*** 
  (2.28)  (5.90) 
Past Return  -0.170***  -0.235*** 
  (-15.05)  (-15.70) 
Turnover  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-1.08)  (-0.87) 
Expense  -0.544*  0.354 
  (-1.91)  (1.18) 
     
Observations 15,188 14,669 14,227 13,723 
R-squared 0.153 0.171 0.269 0.281 





Table 7: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ Stock 
Selectivity (using Sharpe ratio) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in stock selectivity for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and 
following the peak. The skill measure, Sharpe Ratio, is calculated as in Sharpe (1966): average monthly 
excess return over the past 24 months divided by the standard deviation of the monthly excess returns for 
the same period. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Sharpe Ratio × Post 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.268*** 0.278*** 
 (10.59) (10.57) (15.58) (15.76) 
Post -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.094*** -0.090*** 
 (-13.36) (-10.82) (-35.25) (-30.53) 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.031*** -0.023** -0.109*** -0.086*** 
 (-2.80) (-2.06) (-8.74) (-6.87) 
AUM  -0.009***  -0.026*** 
  (-3.91)  (-9.10) 
# Share Class  -0.006***  -0.001 
  (-2.62)  (-0.20) 
Past Return  0.036***  0.058*** 
  (2.92)  (3.88) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000 
  (1.55)  (0.69) 
Expense  0.378  0.339 
  (0.48)  (0.32) 
     
Observations 10,171 9,722 9,733 9,332 
R-squared 0.244 0.242 0.446 0.460 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
Sharpe Ratio × 
Post 0.049*** 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.092*** 
 (3.88) (4.59) (4.46) (5.31) 
Post 0.053*** 0.055*** -0.040*** -0.037*** 




Sharpe Ratio  0.076*** 0.102*** 0.028** 0.053*** 
 (7.23) (9.63) (2.03) (3.70) 
AUM  -0.010***  -0.015*** 
  (-5.04)  (-5.38) 
# Share Class  0.005***  0.012*** 
  (3.88)  (6.79) 
Past Return  -0.224***  -0.280*** 
  (-19.62)  (-18.05) 
Turnover  -0.000**  -0.000** 
  (-2.27)  (-2.40) 
Expense  -0.595***  0.055 
  (-2.59)  (0.22) 
     
Observations 15,164 14,645 14,203 13,699 
R-squared 0.152 0.182 0.256 0.274 





Table 8: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ 
Characteristic Selectivity (using CS Measure) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in characteristic selectivity for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity 
and following the peak. The skill measure, CS, is calculated as in Daniel et al. (1997). All variables are 
defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
CS × Post 0.132* 0.149** 0.050 0.087 
 (1.88) (2.04) (0.62) (1.05) 
Post -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.081*** -0.077*** 
 (-12.07) (-9.80) (-32.02) (-26.90) 
CS 0.093*** 0.066* 0.028 -0.032 
 (2.64) (1.75) (0.67) (-0.67) 
AUM  0.000  -0.015*** 
  (0.10)  (-5.27) 
# Share Class  -0.010***  -0.004 
  (-3.87)  (-1.32) 
Past Return  0.034***  0.081*** 
  (2.60)  (4.09) 
Turnover  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.62)  (-0.50) 
Expense  -0.780  -0.315 
  (-0.92)  (-0.27) 
     
Observations 9,695 9,027 9,244 8,626 
R-squared 0.223 0.227 0.417 0.430 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
CS × Post -0.053 -0.374*** -0.286** -0.723*** 
 (-0.60) (-4.00) (-2.35) (-5.58) 
Post 0.017*** 0.013*** -0.059*** -0.065*** 
 (11.18) (7.89) (-30.23) (-29.85) 
CS 0.503*** 0.714*** 0.524*** 0.846*** 
 (6.85) (9.50) (5.04) (7.70) 




  (1.79)  (-1.12) 
# Share Class  0.002  0.009*** 
  (1.55)  (5.01) 
Past Return  -0.166***  -0.256*** 
  (-13.79)  (-16.26) 
Turnover  -0.000***  -0.000** 
  (-2.83)  (-2.39) 
Expense  -0.676***  -0.050 
  (-2.60)  (-0.16) 
     
Observations 14,749 14,095 13,799 13,200 
R-squared 0.146 0.165 0.257 0.270 





Table 9: The Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers: Managers’ 
Characteristic Timing (using CT measure) 
This table examines the relationship between the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers and 
managers’ skill in characteristic timing for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity 
and following the peak. The skill measure, CT, is calculated as in Daniel et al. (1997) All variables are 
defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
CT × Post -0.930*** -0.932*** -0.730*** -0.652** 
 (-3.89) (-3.79) (-2.80) (-2.45) 
Post -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 (-9.13) (-7.09) (-23.54) (-20.17) 
CT 0.644*** 0.612*** 0.430** 0.333 
 (3.39) (3.14) (2.06) (1.57) 
AUM  -0.000  -0.017*** 
  (-0.13)  (-4.22) 
# Share Class  -0.012***  -0.006 
  (-3.60)  (-1.62) 
Past Return  0.043***  0.072*** 
  (2.82)  (3.58) 
Turnover  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.76)  (-0.29) 
Expense  -1.299  -3.332** 
  (-1.13)  (-2.12) 
     
Observations 6,375 6,055 6,067 5,784 
R-squared 0.238 0.246 0.430 0.443 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 2Y Future Change 
          
CT × Post 0.619** 0.552* 0.007 0.082 
 (2.11) (1.89) (0.02) (0.21) 
Post 0.017*** 0.015*** -0.058*** -0.063*** 
 (10.51) (8.16) (-27.36) (-26.59) 
CT -0.134 -0.211 0.670** 0.467 
 (-0.51) (-0.81) (2.07) (1.41) 




  (3.37)  (-0.68) 
# Share Class  0.002  0.007*** 
  (1.30)  (4.16) 
Past Return  -0.162***  -0.233*** 
  (-13.02)  (-14.12) 
Turnover  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-1.64)  (-0.29) 
Expense  0.018  0.990** 
  (0.05)  (2.21) 
     
Observations 12,616 12,086 11,835 11,346 
R-squared 0.143 0.160 0.263 0.273 





Table 10: Future Returns and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines future returns and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers. The 
dependent variable Return is the peer adjusted return in the next 1, 3, 6, or 12 months. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Return-1 mo. Return-3 mo. Return-6 mo. Return-12 mo. 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.021 0.058** 
 (4.84) (2.82) (1.32) (2.22) 
AUM -0.011*** -0.038*** -0.075*** 0.016*** 
 (-8.50) (-14.47) (-21.99) (2.96) 
# Share Class 0.003** 0.006** 0.009*** -0.015*** 
 (2.16) (2.17) (2.78) (-2.76) 
Past Return 0.019*** 0.013 0.067*** 0.040 
 (2.84) (0.97) (3.94) (1.45) 
Turnover -0.000 -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000 
 (-0.91) (-2.22) (-2.84) (-0.30) 
Expense -1.291*** -4.029*** -5.700*** -11.821*** 
 (-2.58) (-4.06) (-4.46) (-5.66) 
     
Observations 9,160 9,185 9,185 9,185 
R-squared 0.053 0.108 0.169 0.083 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Return-1 mo. Return-3 mo. Return-6 mo. Return-12 mo. 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.002 0.010 0.044*** -0.159*** 
 (0.48) (1.25) (3.84) (-6.98) 
AUM -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.057*** 0.046*** 
 (-10.70) (-19.99) (-30.06) (12.34) 
# Share Class -0.000 -0.003** -0.004** 0.008** 
 (-0.48) (-2.32) (-2.17) (2.47) 
Past Return 0.102*** 0.041*** 0.099*** -0.021 
 (18.00) (4.20) (7.33) (-0.79) 
Turnover -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 
 (-2.43) (-3.16) (-3.25) (1.25) 
Expense -0.107 -0.412** -0.768*** -1.015** 
 (-1.13) (-2.56) (-3.46) (-2.31) 




Observations 15,311 15,399 15,399 15,399 
R-squared 0.042 0.062 0.111 0.039 






Table 11: Future Flows and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines future flows and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers. The 
dependent variable Flow is the  
 
flow in the next 1, 3, 6, or 12 months. Results control for contemporaneous returns. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Flow-1 mo. Flow-3 mo. Flow-6 mo. Flow-12 mo. 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.047*** 0.088 0.063 0.070 
 (2.90) (1.38) (0.72) (1.08) 
Return-1 mo. -0.187***    
 (-6.80)    
Return-3 mo.  -0.237***   
  (-4.33)   
Return-6 mo.   -0.130**  
   (-2.24)  
Return-12 mo.    0.043 
    (1.63) 
AUM -0.032*** -0.113*** -0.200*** -0.109*** 
 (-9.23) (-8.30) (-10.54) (-8.02) 
# Share Class 0.005 0.007 0.015 -0.001 
 (1.62) (0.54) (0.82) (-0.08) 
Past Return 0.056*** 0.229*** 0.422*** 0.304*** 
 (3.27) (3.40) (4.57) (4.46) 
Turnover -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.28) (-1.05) (-1.14) (-0.61) 
Expense -6.149*** -24.358*** -22.431*** -26.324*** 
 (-4.76) (-4.77) (-3.21) (-5.10) 
     
Observations 15,298 15,312 15,332 15,349 
R-squared 0.079 0.245 0.302 0.306 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Flow-1 mo. Flow-3 mo. Flow-6 mo. Flow-12 mo. 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.768*** 1.546*** 2.278*** 2.979*** 




Return-1 mo. 0.125    
 (0.25)    
Return-3 mo.  0.015   
  (0.04)   
Return-6 mo.   0.245  
   (0.47)  
Return-12 mo.   -0.633*** 
    (-4.10) 
AUM -0.132*** -0.363*** -0.730*** -0.593*** 
 (-2.74) (-5.13) (-5.87) (-8.34) 
# Share Class 0.034 0.108* 0.162 0.300*** 
 (0.81) (1.75) (1.52) (4.81) 
Past Return -0.684** -0.440 1.130 -1.566*** 
 (-2.00) (-0.89) (1.32) (-3.13) 
Turnover -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 (-0.08) (0.02) (-0.05) (-0.52) 
Expense -121.961*** -253.694*** -586.075*** -253.456*** 
 (-21.49) (-30.97) (-41.65) (-30.62) 
     
Observations 15,298 15,312 15,332 15,312 
R-squared 0.079 0.245 0.302 0.247 





Table 12: Total Risk and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines total risk and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers for two 24-
month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. The dependent variable Risk 
is the monthly standard deviation of daily returns. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y -0.002* -0.001   
 (-1.88) (-1.01)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.001 -0.001 
   (-0.86) (-1.40) 
AUM  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (3.21)  (3.97) 
#ShareClass  -0.001**  -0.000* 
  (-2.35)  (-1.82) 
Past Return  -0.031  0.001 
  (-1.18)  (0.38) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000* 
  (1.50)  (1.91) 
Expense  0.002  -0.066 
  (0.02)  (-0.49) 
     
Observations 8,723 8,170 7,500 7,042 
R-squared 0.006 0.055 0.029 0.032 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.010 -0.001***   
 (0.76) (-3.06)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.004*** -0.002*** 
   (-10.15) (-4.73) 
AUM  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (7.67)  (7.80) 




  (-2.16)  (-2.28) 
Past Return  -0.018***  -0.017*** 
  (-5.71)  (-5.14) 
Turnover  -0.000  0.000 
  (-0.06)  (0.50) 
Expense  -0.002  0.014 
  (-0.11)  (0.49) 
     
Observations 15,509 14,524 14,322 13,444 
R-squared 0.067 0.054 0.013 0.054 





Table 13: Idiosyncratic Risk and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines idiosyncratic risk and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers for two 
24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. The dependent variable 
Idiosyncratic Risk is the residual from regressing daily returns on the Fama-French-Carhart four factors in 
each month.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Idiosyncratic Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y -0.001 0.000   
 (-1.28) (0.50)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.30) (-0.41) 
AUM  0.000  0.000 
  (1.20)  (1.22) 
#ShareClass  -0.000*  -0.000** 
  (-1.81)  (-2.34) 
Past Return  -0.027  -0.000 
  (-1.23)  (-0.09) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000 
  (0.57)  (1.54) 
Expense  -0.063  -0.141 
  (-0.94)  (-1.22) 
     
Observations 8,718 8,168 7,500 7,042 
R-squared 0.002 0.067 0.032 0.033 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Idiosyncratic Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.013 -0.000   
 (0.97) (-0.90)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.000*** -0.000 
   (-5.28) (-1.18) 
AUM  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (5.06)  (3.58) 




  (-1.19)  (-1.32) 
Past Return  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-0.92)  (-0.87) 
Turnover  0.000  0.000 
  (0.16)  (1.25) 
Expense  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.15)  (-0.09) 
     
Observations 15,508 14,523 14,321 13,443 
R-squared 0.067 0.007 0.002 0.006 







Table 14: Systematic Risk and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines systematic risk and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap managers for two 
24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. The dependent variable 
Systematic Risk is the loading on market factor from regressing daily returns on Fama-French-Carhart four 
factors in each month. All variables are defined in Table 1.  t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Systematic Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y 0.622 0.455   
 (1.21) (0.99)   
LC Change Past 2Y   0.006 0.003 
   (0.13) (0.06) 
AUM  0.005  0.016 
  (0.25)  (1.51) 
#ShareClass  0.006  -0.006 
  (0.45)  (-1.25) 
Past Return  1.896  -0.270* 
  (1.12)  (-1.72) 
Turnover  -0.000  -0.001 
  (-0.37)  (-1.62) 
Expense  8.216  12.852 
  (1.22)  (1.41) 
     
Observations 8,724 8,170 7,501 7,042 
R-squared 0.167 0.232 0.026 0.029 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Systematic Risk 
          
LC Change Past 1Y -0.395 0.013   
 (-0.97) (0.83)   
LC Change Past 2Y   0.007 0.000 
   (0.46) (0.02) 
AUM  -0.000  -0.001 




#ShareClass  -0.001  0.000 
  (-0.58)  (0.21) 
Past Return  -0.178*  -0.154 
  (-1.84)  (-1.48) 
Turnover  -0.000**  -0.000*** 
  (-2.48)  (-5.62) 
Expense  -3.480***  -5.055*** 
  (-5.86)  (-4.85) 
     
Observations 15,512 14,526 14,324 13,446 
R-squared 0.067 0.013 0.012 0.019 





Table 15: Persistence and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines the future change in large-cap holdings and the change in large-cap holdings by small-
cap managers for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 
          
LC Change Past 1Y -0.277*** -0.279***   
 (-9.13) (-8.99)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.482*** -0.489*** 
   (-13.17) (-13.19) 
AUM  0.006  0.009 
  (0.96)  (1.03) 
#ShareClass  -0.015***  -0.025*** 
  (-2.75)  (-3.28) 
Past Return  0.074***  0.146*** 
  (4.11)  (8.44) 
Turnover  -0.000  -0.001** 
  (-0.46)  (-1.97) 
Expense  -2.311  -5.828* 
  (-1.29)  (-1.72) 
     
Observations 8,018 7,594 6,624 6,316 
R-squared 0.274 0.283 0.525 0.545 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1Y Future Change 
          
LC Change Past 1Y -0.340*** -0.356***   
 (-11.80) (-12.41)   
LC Change Past 2Y   -0.683*** -0.685*** 
   (-21.11) (-19.95) 
AUM  -0.008  -0.004 
  (-1.62)  (-0.49) 




  (3.64)  (0.64) 
Past Return  -0.176***  -0.153*** 
  (-12.48)  (-10.54) 
Turnover  -0.000*  -0.000** 
  (-1.89)  (-2.39) 
Expense  -1.268***  -0.799* 
  (-4.06)  (-1.79) 
     
Observations 13,711 13,133 11,879 11,408 
R-squared 0.209 0.234 0.475 0.478 




Table 16: Time Series Placebo Test and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap 
Managers 
This table examines using a Dec. 2005 pseudo-peak and the change in large-cap holdings by small-cap 
managers for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. The 
variable Post Peak represents the period 2006-2007. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Pseudo-recession period (peak=December 2005) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Large Cap Holding 
          
Post Peak 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.13) (0.27) 
AUM   0.026** 0.002 
   (5.18) (0.52) 
#ShareClass   -0.008 -0.011** 
   (-2.13) (-3.37) 
Past Return   0.025 0.006 
   (1.05) (0.43) 
Turnover   -0.004 -0.000 
   (-0.98) (-0.53) 
Expense   4.266** 3.575 
   (5.37) (2.25) 
     
Observations 18,594 18,594 17,227 17,221 
R-squared 0.000 0.896 0.066 0.902 






Table 17: Alpha and the Drift to Large-Cap Holdings by Small-Cap Managers 
This table examines the future change in large-cap holdings and the change in large-cap holdings by small-
cap managers for two 24-month periods: prior to the peak in economic activity and following the peak. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by fund. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First recession period (peak=March 2001, trough=November 2001) 
 




Alpha FF3 Alpha FF4 Alpha 
 
        
LC Change Past 1Y 0.074*** 0.004 0.010 0.005 
 (7.70) (0.70) (1.60) (0.79) 
AUM -0.030*** -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (-14.75) (-0.99) (1.63) (-0.72) 
# Share Class -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.57) (0.78) (0.02) (0.85) 
Past Return 0.029*** 0.447*** 0.222*** 0.246*** 
 (2.83) (75.87) (35.01) (37.45) 
Turnover -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.78) (0.31) (-0.79) (-1.31) 
Expense -4.864*** -0.496 -0.451 0.378 
 (-6.28) (-1.12) (-0.94) (0.76) 
     
Observations 9,160 9,125 9,125 9,125 
R-squared 0.071 0.422 0.165 0.163 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Second recession period (peak= December 2007, trough= June 2009) 
 




Alpha FF3 Alpha FF4 Alpha 
 
        
LC Change Past 1Y -0.011 0.021*** 0.000 0.007* 
 (-1.62) (7.68) (0.04) (1.83) 
AUM -0.015*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002*** 
 (-13.83) (-7.45) (-1.52) (-3.22) 
# Share Class -0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.85) (4.53) (1.59) (1.32) 
Past Return 0.292*** 0.150*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 




Turnover -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (-0.33) (-3.38) (-2.14) (-0.80) 
Expense -0.203 -0.110** -0.096 -0.142* 
 (-1.53) (-2.03) (-1.28) (-1.77) 
     
Observations 15,311 15,221 15,221 15,221 
R-squared 0.106 0.163 0.057 0.047 
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